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E A R L Y  W A R N IN G S , E A R L Y  W A R N E R S, E A R L Y  R E S P O N S E  
Reflections on T ete  (1989) and Southern Africa (1992)
INTRODUCTION
I. E a r l y  W a r n i n g  S y s t e m s
A. Satellite Photo Interpretation/Weather Interpretation (Availability and Adequacy)
B. Bottom Up Data Aggregation (Zonal, National)
• Crop Projections/Outcomes
• Market Surveys (Quantity Price)
• Health - Morbidity, Underweight (Malnutrition)
II. D e m a n d , S u p p l y , L o g i s t i c s  B a l a n c e s
A. Domestic Production
• Total
• Producer Consumed
• Marketed
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Imports
• Commercial - Known Channels
• - ‘Border Traffic’
• Committed Food Aid 
Stocks
BALANCE (National-Zonal-Urban-Rural)
B. Response To Imbalance
• Commercial Purchases (Finance)
• Emergency Appeal
III. W a t e r  - T h e  F o r g o t t e n  F a c t o r
• Sporadic Inclusion (e.g. UNICEF Southern Africa 1992)
• Can cause more dislocation than food production fall if logistics for food aid OK
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TETE PROVINCE 1989
A. Road to Dearth
• 1997/98 Crop Failure (Rainfall/Civil War)
• Blockage Urban Food Aid (bureaucratic)
B. Early Warning
• Provincial Calamities Commission
C. Early Non-Response
• FAO - no drought/’normal’ rainfall
•  UN Provincial Food Aid Coordinator - annual leave as warning given
• Confusion
I). Rapid Reassessment
• Finance Ministry exploration team
• Horrified Report
• Finance to PM to President
• UNICEF to UNDP to New York
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E. Results
• 6 months 600 tonnes/6 weeks 6,000
• Bureaucratic Snag, with EU cleared
• Vehicles ‘found’
• ‘Compulsory Unloading’ food to Malawi (official or unofficial averted)
• 20,000 do not die
4
SOUTHERN AFRICA (1992): The Great Drought (91-92), The Great Dearth (92-93), 
Averting The (ireat Death (92-93)
A. T h e  G r e a t  D r o u g h t  1991/92
• Precursor Years
• Reserve Movements
• 1991/92 Rains
• Course of War
• Limited Commercial Import Capacity
B . E a r l y  W a r n i n g s  - T h e  F o u r  H o r s e m e n  M o u n t  T o  R i d e
• National - Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia, Mozambique
• Regional - SADC Food Security Unit
• Concerned - UNICEF/W FP (Maputo), NGO’s, Jan Pronk, Others
E . T h e  T o x i n  S o u n d s
• EU (Brussels) with Pledges
• NGO/UNICEF/SADCC
• “ It may indeed to too late... if we do not even try history will not forgive us nor 
should it”.
• 3,000,000 lives at risk
F. B e l a t e d  E a r l y  R e s p o n s e
• FAO/WFP (plus UNICEF) assessment moved June to March
• Accept National/SADCC Data (April)
• Detailed Regional/National Need Analysis
• UN-SADCC Pledging Conference (June)
• SADC/SA Logistics Coordination
G . R e s u l t s
• Food Flows
• Reaches Mozambique Ports and Zimbabwe Field Distribution Centres 5 to 10 days 
before stocks and other flows would have run out
• Only one arterial port route clogs (Durban - and why)
• Rural Water Dislocated Higher than Food 2 cities/municipal zones of 1 million 
each within fortnight of evacuation before new rain flows arrive
• Varied ad hoc Distribution Systems
• 2,800,000 do not die - 200,000 almost all where war impeded delivery
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H . B u i l d i n g  o n  S u c c e s s
• Donors pat selves on back as sole authors of success
• Near deadly lay in response overlooked
• Future water strategy and basic vulnerability reduction the 2 cities not achieved 
(much less implemented)
• River Basin Water Allocation Conventions Begun (SADCC)
• Systematic Work For Food Standby and National Interim Stock Build-up Not 
Financed
• 1997 Lesser Dearth Response Only Slightly More Timeous Than 1992 and 
Possibly Less Adequate In Scope.
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WHAT IS TO BE DONE
A. Early Warning
B. Analysis
C. Outcry
D. Joint (Regional Action) - Analysis, Outcry, Negotiation, Logistic
E. National System Preparation
• Works Programmes (Standby)
• Food Sales To Finance Emergency Works Jobs
• Focus National and Domestic Social Sector Institutions
• Phasing Northwestern NGO’s Out of Major Roles
F. • Include Water
• Include Future Vulnerability Reduction (in Works Done, in Interim Stock Building)
- R H Green 
June 1997
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